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The interest in innovation as a growth, competitiveness and well-being driv-
er is nowadays a shared vision among countries at different levels of devel-
opment. Most countries in the world have a national agenda (paper, policy)
for innovation, with fairly similar priorities and objectives. This, at least, is
true at the rhetorical level. Or to use the words of Gerad De Graaf, head of
unit in charge of the Lisbon Strategy at the European Commission,
“Everybody agrees that there should be more innovation. I have never met
anybody in my life who says that ‘I am against innovation’. Is anybody
against panda bears? Or against Santa Claus?”. This does not mean that
countries all share the same view regarding what is innovation, why public
policy should support it and how to do it. But this means that we are in a
‘pro-innovation’ era, even in non-frontier regions where in the recent past
innovation and technological development were expected to naturally
appear through trade and foreign investments. (ECLAC, 2008a, 2008b;
Radosevic, 2009; OECD, 2009; UNIDO, 2009).
2This generalized interest in innovation in part derives from the current con-
text shaped by newly established (ICT) and radically new (biotech and nan-
otech) technological paradigms which are transforming the way in which
agents (individuals, firms and countries) produce, trade and invest, thus cre-
ating a situation in which the possibilities and spaces for innovation are mul-
tiple and different from the previous age (think for example about wide vari-
ety of successful business models, or the new ways of doing health-relat-
ed research). In the global knowledge economy innovating has become
imperative. 
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are fairly different regions in
terms of size, political dynamics, and prevailing economic specialization and
trade patterns. However, both regions underwent similar reforms patterns
since the decade of the 1990s which influenced the evolution of science,
technology and innovation policy in a similar way. The Washington
Consensus recipe marginalized science and technology (S&T) policies and
instead aimed at targeting inflation and at the reestablishment of macro-
economic stability through openness, privatization and deregulation
1. In the
2000s both regions faced a slow return of policies supporting innovation
and competitiveness. However, besides the different reforms and the
design of S&T plans and policies, both regions are still marginal actors in
the S&T game. The reasons behind the persistence in aggregate scientific,
technological and production backwardness are manifold. Among those rea-
sons, the dynamics of the evolution of S&T policies and the ‘stop and go’
approach induced by each wave of reforms which transformed those poli-
cies into a moving target is a key issue, usually not addressed by the inno-
vation policy literature. Cumulativeness and path dependency do not affect
only innovation dynamics; they also influence the evolution of policies.
In this paper we are interested in analyzing the dynamics of the innovation
policy in non-frontier countries, and their relationship with structural change
and development. 
In the current context of redefinition of global powers, with new actors
gaining ground in the knowledge game, like China, India, Russia and Brazil,
frontier countries are reflecting on how they can support innovation and
which type of innovation strategy they should pursue in the next decades
to sustain their competitiveness and avoid losing ground with respect to
emerging economies. Also, we can witness increasing efforts at generating
better innovation policies to respond to emerging challenges such as envi-
ronment and sustainability, pushing the innovation policy discourse back
3
1 For the discussion of the Washington Consensus see Williamson, 2002; Kregel, 2008; Rodrik,
2006.into a systemic approach of policy mix to support the varieties of capabili-
ties needed for innovating in the new economic era. In addition, the finan-
cial crises has, on the one hand, steepened the catching up climb for many
developing countries as they lack the resources for fiscal stimulus programs
to counter-balance the loss of export demand; while at the same time
advanced economies increasingly recognize scientific capacities and entre-
preneurial innovation capabilities as key assets for a successful way out of
the crisis. 
The pressure on developing economies to create capabilities for innovation
is rising. Catching up and peripheral countries face more challenging task in
creating and implementing effective innovation policies. For them, beyond
the rhetoric that innovation matters for development, it is crucial to identi-
fy which types of innovations to support and how to do it, given the con-
straints posed by budgetary reasons and by trade incentives that tend to
push towards specializing into low value added activities (ECLAC, 2008a).
Analyzing the shortcomings of the past processes of reforms in S&T and
innovation policies might help to avoid incurring the same errors, and it
could help in re-linking innovation policies to production development and
to bring back into the policy debate the issue of the sectoral differences in
science, technology and production which has been the missing issue in the
innovation policy discourse since the structural reforms of the nineties
2. 
Production structure and incentives for innovation
When it comes to innovation, Latin America (LA) and Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) evoke two different stories. CEE is largely seen as a success
story, especially in relation with the ICT boom. For instance, at the end of
2005, Business Week ran a cover story titled “Central Europe – Rise of a
Powerhouse”.
3 LA, on the contrary, is generally seen as a region still strug-
gling with catching up and which is at the margins of global knowledge
economies (Cimoli et al., 2005; ECLAC, 2008a; 2008b). 
However, besides the divergent perceptions, the two regions display simi-
larities in terms of persistent gaps with frontier economies in terms of pro-
duction structure specialization and aggregate innovation performance. In
addition, both regions, besides the aggregate low performance, show high
intra-regional heterogeneity and they both have a country which for size,
political strategy and accumulated capacity plays on a different ground:
Brazil and Russia, respectively. 
4
2 Radosevic, 2009 offers a very good summary discussion on the topic.
3 Below we use CEE for the EU member states in the region, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia5
The experiences of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are par-
ticularly interesting, because the two regions have followed relatively simi-
lar development path since the decade of the nineties, i.e. growing integra-
tion into global trade and rising FDI, and, in the last decade, rising interest
in innovation as a driver for economic growth. In addition, although coming
from different experiences in the pre-Washington Consensus era (i.e.,
import substitution and the Soviet system), both regions were, at the time
of liberalization, in the process of construction and consolidation of endoge-
nous capabilities for science and technology.
Currently, despite the public policy efforts, which anyway remain low in
comparison to frontier countries, both regions display a persistent gap in
innovation capabilities and efforts. Investment in R&D is not on a rising
trend; investment in human resources for S&T is yet marginal, while out-
come indicators are not encouraging as well, take the low number of sci-
entific publications and patents, for example. 
A comparative look at R&D investment trend shows the asymmetry
between Latin America, Central and Easter Europe and the rest of the world
(see Figure 1). Early industrializers such as the USA and the ‘old’ European
countries show almost stable expenditure in R&D as a % of GDP since
1990. Relatively recent catching up countries, like Finland and South Korea,
have markedly increased their R&D efforts. This growth has been the result
of a deep structural change that transformed those economies into high
tech producers and exporters thanks to the implementation of policies tai-
lored to strengthen domestic technological capabilities.
4 On the contrary,
Central and Easter European countries decreased the intensity of R&D
investments, due to the change in the prevailing policy model. Latin
American countries, in turn, show persistence in the marginal R&D effort,
which is consistent with the marginal changes that occurred in its produc-
tion structure along the last two decades. 
4 Hobday, 2009 offers an excellent discussion of evolution of East Asian industrial and innovation
policies in response to changing technological paradigms during the last five decades. On Finland,
see Ylä-Anttila and Lemola, 2006.Figure 1. R&D INVESTMENT AS % OF GDP, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
5
Source: OECD-MSTI Database, RICYT.
The asymmetry with frontier countries persists when we look at the expen-
diture on R&D by sector of performance. In frontier economies firms carry
out the majority of R&D activities, followed by higher education institutes
and the government. In Central and Eastern Europe similarly the private sec-
tor delivers the majority of R&D activities; however, the involvement of the
private sector in R&D is lower than in more industrialized countries.
6 The
pattern in Latin America differs; the majority of R&D is executed by the gov-
ernment or by the higher education sector (Table 1).
6
5 Central and Easter European data consists of the average of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovak Republic, Romania and Slovenia.
6 CEE picture changes quite significantly when one adds the Baltic countries and Bulgaria and
Romania; the private sector share decreases.Table 1. R&D EXPENDITURE BY SECTOR OF PERFFORMANCE, 2006 (%)
Source: RICYT, OECD-MSTI Database and UNESCO..
As for trends in higher education, more similarity appears with respect to
frontier economies. Both LA and CEE substantially increased the stock of
skilled human resources form the 1970s onwards, however the gap with







Latin America and the Caribbean 20 40.9 37.1 2
Argentina 40.7 30.4 26.5 2.5
Bolivia (2002) 21.0 25.0 41.0 13.0
Brazil (2004) 21.3 40.2 38.4 0.1
Chile (2004) 23.0 26.6 41.8 8.6
Colombia 8.3 22.2 52.8 16.7
Costa Rica (2004) 17.0 28.0 34.0 21.0
Ecuador 75.5 19.0 4.2 1.3
Mexico) (2005) 23.2 46.9 28.7 1.1
Panama (2005) 37.1 .. 8.6 54.2
Paraguay (2005) 14.6 38.5 35.4 11.5
Peru (2004) 25.6 29.2 38.1 7.1
Trinidad and Tobago  (2004) 54.3 23.7 21.9 ..
Uruguay (2002) 19.4 49.0 31.6 0.0
Central and Easter Europe
Check Republic 17.5 66.2 15.9 0.4
Hungary 25.4 48.3 24.4 ..
Poland 37.0 31.5 31.0 0.4
Slovak Republic 32.8 43.1 24.1 0.1
Slovenia 24.1 60.2 15.1 0.2
Russian Federation 27.0 66.7 6.1 0.3
United States 11.3 71.0 13.5 4.2
Total OECD 11.4 69.1 17.2 2.6
EU-15 12.7 63.9 22.3 1.2
Finland 9.3 71.3 18.7 0.6
Japan 8.3 77.2 12.7 1.9
Korea 11.6 77.3 10.0 1.2
China 19.7 71.1 9.2 ..
Singapore 10.3 65.7 23.9 3.7
Israel 5.3 77.2 13.7 0.38
Figure 2. TERTIARY ENROLLEMENT RATIO
Source: UNESCO, 2009 Global Education Digest
Within the region there are differences which international cross-country
comparisons hide. In Latin America, the more proactive countries in terms of
R&D spending are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Cuba, which as a
whole account for almost 80% of regional spending. R&D expenditure in
Latin America is mostly carried out by the state, in contrast with more
advanced economies; however patterns differ. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Paraguay and Uruguay enterprises carry out more than 30% of total R&D
spending, while in Ecuador and Colombia the participation of the private sec-
tor in R&D execution is extremely low. The three countries with the highest
ratio of researchers per million habitants in the region are Cuba, Argentina
and Chile, while the ranking for absolute numbers of researchers is: Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina. As for the mobility of graduate and post-graduate stu-
dents, Argentina and Chile are the preferred destination within the countries
of the region; even though the United States, the UK and Spain are the top
foreign destinations for Latin American students. (ECLAC, 2008b) 
In CEE there is a clear divide between countries in the European Union
and those outside.
7 The former exhibit relatively homogenous rates of
7 Besides Russia, these are former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldova; and former
Yugoslavian republics not in the EU (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia,
Montenegro, Kosovo).
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change (e.g. in high tech exports or FDI inflows; see further Kattel,
Reinert and Suurna, 2009). The latter, however, with the exception of
Russia perhaps, have seen enormous declines in technological develop-
ment. (World Bank, 2008).
In general, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe show ‘periphery’
features: co-existence of islands of technological excellence with a gener-
alized low-tech and low-skilled labor production structure and marginal posi-
tioning in global production chains (ECLAC, 2004; ECLAC, 2008a; Kattel,
Reinert and Suurna, 2009). In both regions, Brazil and Russia, for the accu-
mulated scientific and technological capabilities and for current political
strategies sustaining production development might play the role of region-
al geese. Although, for the CEE EU members, Russia plays less and less
important role in trade; in particular Central European countries such as
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have achieved high levels of inte-
gration with the EU: merchandising exports in worth of up to 60% of GDP
goes in these countries to the EU (IMF DOTS database). These countries
have become the main trading partners for Germany.
Latin American and Easter European countries spend comparatively less on
R&D with respect to frontier economies and invest less in the generation of
human capital for scientific and technological activities. Latin America
shows higher intra-regional heterogeneity in terms of technological special-
ization of the production structure with respect to Eastern Europe, which
also appears to be relatively more specialized in high tech activities. This is
not surprising considering that higher levels of R&D investments are gener-
ally associated with higher weight of high tech industries in domestic pro-
duction structure (see Figure 3).
Different industries produce and innovate in a different way. An increase in
R&D expenditure with a production structure oriented towards low tech-
nology industries is hardly to happen. The specialization pattern determines
the prevailing innovation effort. Hence, incentives to increase R&D invest-
ments need to be coupled with policies supporting production and entre-
preneurship in key R&D intensive sectors.Figure 3. TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION AND INNOVATION EFFORT
Source: ECLAC, CyT-DES (www.cepal.org/iyd
The evolution of innovation policy
The evolution of innovation policies in Latin America and in Central and
Easter Europe followed similar patterns. In both regions the efforts related
to the creation of domestic scientific and technological capabilities date
back to around half a century ago, even though they were framed in two
different policy models: the import substitution strategy and the Soviet
planned economy. During those years, both regions experienced a period of
deliberate state intervention focused to the construction of domestic scien-
tific and technological capabilities.
As a consequence of the debt crisis, both regions experimented similar
reform patterns. During the nineties the two regions followed the
Washington Consensus market oriented approach to development. State
intervention was almost banned and markets were supposed to take the
lead for structural change and development. Increased integration into inter-
national trade and openness were understood to bring about the right incen-
tives and competition to support modernization and innovation rationalizing
investments and prompting efficiency. However, this was not the case, and
liberalization clearly proved not to be enough for catching up.
1011
Microeconomic adjustments required more than openness and competition
to transform production structures. The free market approach showed its
limits in generating the rights incentives for innovation, and policies restart-
ed to get legitimacy. The 2000s signed the transition to the post-
Washington Consensus strategy (Peres and Primi, 2009; Radosevic 2009).
Innovation policies came back on the agenda, usually framed under the
umbrella of the national innovation systems approach or as plans support-
ing competitiveness. The 2008 financial crisis might induce a new phase in
innovation policy, as countries are urged to redefine investment plans. A
brief description of innovation policy in LA and in CEE follows.  
Latin America
8
During the fifties and sixties, government actions, which nowadays would
be labeled S&T policies, aimed at creating the institutional infrastructure
for S&T and at fostering the generation of endogenous scientific and tech-
nological capabilities in national priority areas, in line with the industrial-
ization strategy of local production capacities expansion. Government
action targeted the creation of scientific and technical knowledge in prior-
ity areas for national development. The state owned firms and carried out
R&D activities in strategic sectors like transport and telecommunication;
while public research institutes supported research in agriculture, energy,
mining, forestry, and the aeronautics sector (ECLAC, 2004; Cimoli, Ferraz,
Primi, 2005). 
Governments invested in the creation of the basic scientific and technolog-
ical infrastructure to support the national industrialization effort in key sci-
entific and technological areas. For instance, Argentina instituted the
National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1954 and in 1957 the
Institute for Industrial Technology (INTI). The main function was the provi-
sion of technology services to state owned companies.
9 Correspondingly
Mexico opened the National Institute for Nuclear Research (ININ), the
Electronics Research Institute (IIE), the Mexican Institute for Water
Technology (IMTA) and the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP). Consistently
with a selective industrial focus, Brazil created a series of sectoral institu-
tions. In the early fifties was established the Aerospace Technology Centre
(CTA), while almost twenty years later, in 1973, was set up the Agricultural
Research Enterprise (EMBRAPA), (Burlamaqui et al., 2007). According to
the predominant logic of state intervention as an engine of growth, many
public enterprises established their own research centers like ELETROBRAS’
8 This sub-section draws on Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi (2005).
9 For additional information about Argentina, see Yoguel (2003); for Mexico Casalet (2003); for
Brazil Pacheco (2003) and Burlamaqui et al. (2007).Electrical Energy Research Centre (CEPEL) and the Leopoldo Américo M. de
Mello Research and Development Centre (CENPES) run by PETROBRAS
(ECLAC, 2004; Pacheco, 2003).
This policy model contributed to the creation of S&T infrastructure, creat-
ing the basis for future technological upgrading. At the same time, the
model was weak in coordinating different sectoral agencies leading to over-
lapping initiatives and consequent waste of resources (Capdevielle, Casalet
and Cimoli, 2000; ECLAC, 2004; Yoguel, 2003).
In the eighties, the debt crises and the ‘lost decade’ diverted the attention
from the long-term industrialization effort. Short-term inflation targeting
policies prevailed. Macroeconomic stability was the priority, and there was
no much room left for policies to foster capability accumulation. In addition,
the out-of-crisis recipe (proposed by international financial institutions, and
well accepted by most of the governments of the region) transformed state
intervention into the less desirable tool for technological development.
Open and global markets were supposed to guarantee efficient allocation of
resources and ultimately technological upgrading in the region. Capital
goods imports, technology licensing and the need to compete with foreign
and more technologically advanced firms would have put the enough pres-
sure on domestic firms for modernization and innovation. Actually, Latin
American countries modernized their production apparatus, thanks to those
channels. However, modernization remained circumscribed to leading and
larger firms and it did not trickled down to the rest of the production struc-
ture, contributing to increase the structural heterogeneity within and
between the countries of the region, (ECLAC, 2008a) Furthermore,
Washington Consensus reforms partially deepened macroeconomic prob-
lems inherited from 1970:
“a rapid increase in external financing (much of which was not
used for import substitution at all), such as the one that occurred 
in the 1970s, places a heavy burden on a country’s balance of
payments that can only be financed by increased foreign borrow-
ing. This appears to have been the case in Latin America in the 
1970s as increased borrowing was used to meet increasing debt 
service in a sort of Ponzi scheme. … The problems that were faced
by import substitution industrialization were caused as much by 
the inappropriate and potentially incendiary mix of financing
domestic import substitution industrialization through private
external financial flows as in the inherent difficulties in building
sufficiently large domestic markets to support competitive domes-
tic industry and avoid rent-seeking behavior”, (Kregel 2008).
12These changes favored the generation of an industrial structure that ‘per se’
expresses a scant demand for knowledge, thus implicitly limiting the poten-
tial positive stimuli effect towards technological catch up of liberalization
and increased competition. In contrast, the Asian economies like Korea and
Taiwan, followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, were successful in
creating expanding capabilities in technology intensive industries and pro-
duction stages, combining selective import substitution policies with
aggressive, but gradual, export oriented strategies.
10
The rationalization of regional production processes resulted in a ‘truncated’
modernization because the leapfrog towards effective domestic technologi-
cal upgrading is still to be done. Technological upgrading entails the devel-
opment of endogenous capabilities through complex, dynamic and collective
trial and error processes, which need to be backed up by targeted policies.
In the new global knowledge economy, with increasingly powerful foreign
actors and weak domestic scientific and technological infrastructure, market
incentives push firms to increasingly rely on foreign sources of knowledge.
At the same time, the few local results of innovation and technological
upgrading tend to be transferred abroad, and not to be appropriated locally.
The rising prices of commodities in the last years, the improvement in the
terms of trade for natural resources and the consequent appreciation of
regional exchange rates have reduced the incentives for production diversi-
fication in favor of technological capabilities, undermining S&T policy effec-
tiveness and implementation. A self-reinforcing process of concentration in
fewer activities took place, reducing the incentives to learn and invest in
other sectors. (ECLAC, 2008a)
The science and technology policy model of the nineties emphasized the
role of markets incentives and of demand side in priority setting. The sup-
port to technological upgrading and to private sector innovation focused on
areas where market failures occurred; i.e. public policies priority was mere-
ly correcting information asymmetries between economic agents. This
stance towards public policy meant placing knowledge and innovation on
an equal footing with information accessibility. In effect, a conceptual lin-
earity associated with the process of knowledge generation and technolo-
gy diffusion persisted. Knowledge was supposed to follow bottom-up non-
hierarchical pattern, in a setting where the engine for innovation generation
was the supposed spontaneous demand of the private sector, acting as a
major technology booster. 
13
10 The literature on the ‘Asian miracle’ is vast; for some analysis sustaining the role of policies see
Amsden, 1989; Jomo, 1997 and Wade, 1990. For a comparative analysis of the evolution of indus-
trial development and technological capabilities between Latin American and Asian economies see
Cimoli et al., 2006.The shift in policy models entailed institutional and organizational changes.
New management styles were introduced and new institutional bodies were
created. In Argentina, for instance, the restructuring of S&T institutional
infrastructure led to an increase in coordination among different bodies,
partly overcoming what represented a structural limit of the previous peri-
od. In Mexico, in turn, the priority was the decentralization of S&T institu-
tional management, according to the different technological and specializa-
tion patterns of various Mexican regions. 
Beyond countries’ peculiarities, the reorganization of institutions gener-
ally brought about: i) increments in resources and in the relevance of
those S&T agencies dedicated to capture private sector demand for
technology and knowledge, ii) an incipient interest towards greater artic-
ulation and coordination between private and public sector, resulting in
cross-countries augmented interest in universities-enterprises connec-
tions and, iii) changes in competencies and objectives of agencies. S&T
priorities shifted from basic research to the provision and commercial-
ization of technological services, mainly oriented to support production
process management and quality control. Reward systems and manage-
ment styles of S&T institutions changed as well, moving towards prac-
tices that are more in line with market mechanisms and incentive
schemes, privileging performance based models of evaluation and allo-
cation of priorities. Accordingly, the role of international financial insti-
tutions as source of financing for S&T augmented.
In the more recent years, policies started to gradually regain a certain
degree of legitimization, usually under the label of policies for competitive-
ness or cluster development. Such policy evolution naturally entailed a
national based focus of policies and instruments. The primary effort of
building domestic capabilities and infrastructure, as well as the focus on
competitiveness required a national consensus and a primary look at the
country’s needs and priorities.
The management of policies for science technology and innovation follows
different institutional arrangements in the countries of the region.
Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica and Venezuela have ministries for S&T,
while in the other countries the policy responsibility is placed in National
Councils which, in general, respond to the Presidency, to the Ministry of
Education or to the Ministry of Economy. Beyond asymmetries in institu-
tional infrastructure, there are considerable differences among countries in
terms of origins of funds, magnitude of administered budgets, objectives
and priorities. Each country establishes its own science and technology pol-
icy, which is more or less formalized and contextualized according to the
institutional development, the complexity of the production apparatus and
14articulation of the national innovation system
11. The sets of instruments for
S&T policies are well known in the countries of the region. Usually the bot-
tlenecks appear more at the level of implementation and management than
at the level of policy design. In short three main issues might be highlight-
ed: the instruments for supporting human capital formation and public pri-
vate partnership, technology funds and the rising topic of IP management. 
An area of general consensus is the support for human capital formation for
S&T. Brazil with its articulated system of grants and loans for financing uni-
versity postgraduate studies forms around 7000 PhDs per year and scores
the highest in domestically formed PhDs in the region (accounting for more
than 70% of total Latin American PhDs according to RICYT’s estimates).
Almost all countries have, at least at the level of policy design some meas-
ures to support human capital formation. In Argentina the 2004 Argentine
National Plan for Technology and Production Innovation put in its forefront
the strengthening of national scientific and technological base through sup-
porting PhDs formation. In Chile the National Commission for Scientific and
Technological Research (CONICYT) supports postgraduate training through a
series of articulated pad-hoc programs oriented to assist PhDs formation
within the country and through international networking. The Bolivian
National Secretary for Science, Technology and Innovation, the Colombian
National Program for Industrial and Technological Development 2000-2010
and the Uruguayan National Service for C&T (SENACYT) and FUNDACYT
support post graduate and doctoral human capital formation through credit
and grants systems. In Costa Rica support to graduate and post-graduate
studies is mainly coming from private universities, while in Mexico National
Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) allocates public funds for
sustaining high level human capital formation and the Public Research
Centres (CPI) directly intervene in human capital formation and subsidize it
through grants which are financed by specific CPI’s funds. According to a
selective intervention strategy, in Peru the Genome Program finance post-
graduate formation in genetics, while the Paraguayan 2002 National C&T
policy prioritize formation in the engineering and mining sectors, for example.
Resources to finance S&T activities are channelled for the most part
through technology funds. At the country level, deep differences emerge in
terms of beneficiaries and targets (research centres, enterprises, and spe-
cial treatment given in certain cases to SMEs), source of financing, i.e.
national (private or public) and international, and in terms of access mech-
15
11 In November 2007, a group of countries of the region signed a protocol agreement expressing
the political support for the generation of a regional dialogue for S&T policies for increasing cooper-
ation in S&T policy formulation and implementation in the frame of the ECLAC activities for S&T
policies. The issue of regional cooperation in S&T policy represents a key element in the manage-
ment of S&T policies in global knowledge economies (Primi, 2009).anisms (basically supply or demand-side mechanisms or mixed). Since the
structural reforms, technology funds have been fostering the promotion of
consultancies and technical assistance services aiming to reinforce R&D in
universities, research centres and enterprises. Two main categories of funds
exist in the region: the one oriented to the demand and the other which
emphasizes the coordination between demand and supply. 
The demand subsidy scheme, which prevails in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica
and Mexico, channels public funds, or loans from international organizations, to
S&T activities subsidizing the demand by following a horizontal logic based on
the evaluation of proposals and applications directly presented by potential
recipients (enterprises or research centres). For instance, the Argentine
Technological Fund (FONTAR) prioritize 5 areas in S&T development: i) tech-
nological development of new products, services or production processes, ii)
technological modernization, i.e. improvement of products and processes, train-
ing, iii) promotion of the technological services market, supporting research lab-
oratories and business research centres activities, iv) training and technical
assistance and v) technological advisory assistance programmes especially to
strengthen small and medium-sized enterprises’ technological performance. The
fund, which allocate resources on the basis of a demand-pull mechanism, is
made up of national financial resources originating from national budget, fiscal
credit law, credit lines of public banks and of resources originating from inter-
national loans (IADB loans according to the Argentine Modernization Plan).
The FONTAR assigns financial resources to demanding beneficiaries princi-
pally in the form of non-repayable contributions, loans, subsidies and fiscal
credit according to specific objectives and prospective beneficiaries. This kind
of system, where access to incentives for innovation depends upon a direct
initiative of potential targets, may lead to increasing heterogeneity in techno-
logical behaviours because it could ingenerate adverse selection mechanisms
among recipients. In the demand subsidy scheme, incentives to recur to
financial assistance for innovation are biased. More pro-active agents, which
perhaps have a comparative advantage in technological upgrading, and that
could probably master technological innovation without recurring to public
funds will be more prone to submit projects for evaluation; while more tech-
nological backward actors will face higher barriers to participate in this
scheme. A further weakness of the demand subsidy model is that a proper
information dissemination policy is needed in order to allow beneficiaries to
be aware of the possibility offered by the financing schemes. Most of the
sub-utilization of technological funds managed under a demand-oriented
mechanism is that potential beneficiaries lack information
12.
16
12 See Casalet, 2003; Jaramillo, 2003; Pacheco, 2003; Vargas Alfaro and Segura Bonilla, 2003;
Yoguel, 2003The Brazilian system of sectoral technology funds, introduced 1999, over-
comes the limits of a purely demand-pull or technology-push incentive
scheme. It represents a step forward in regional technology policy design
on two accounts: regarding mechanisms to finance S&T and in terms of
operational management. Twelve industrial technological funds are set up
through 12 sectoral laws that identify the amount of the income generated
in each industrial sector that has to be devoted to support S&T develop-
ment in the corresponding industry. Then, these 12 industrial funds collec-
tively contribute to sustain S&T and R&D in three priority non industry-spe-
cific areas for which three respective funds are built up (cooperation among
universities, research centres and enterprises, maintenance and improve-
ment of R&D infrastructure, and development of S&T activities in the
Amazonian region). The Brazilian sectoral technology fund scheme entails a
strategic collective management approach. Representatives of academies
and research centres, industrial ministries, members of the Minister for
Science and Technology, the business sector and regulatory bodies consti-
tute a mixed management committee that run each technological fund
according to a coordinated and consensual strategy. This mechanism,
which has the great advantage of promoting coordination and stimulating
interaction between private and public sector in technological management,
is hard to administer and could originate serious governance troubles which
could lead to a sub-utilization of the funds. 
In addition to funds there are the fiscal incentive schemes, which essentially
take the form of i) tax credits and deductions for different types of R&D
activities according to the categories of involved actors, ii) public develop-
ment bank loans. Both mechanisms are marginal in terms of use, even
though information on fiscal incentive laws is quite easily accessible in
many cases. Fiscal incentives are powerful tools to foster selective devel-
opment of S&T activities because they allow prioritising in a simple way
13.
Risk capital is an indirect form of fostering science and technology devel-
opment. Public institutions act as a convoy for private financial resources
that flow, through risk capital operations, to business activities consenting
to convert technologically advanced projects into operating production enti-
ties
14. Albeit their worldwide-recognized role in favouring technological
development, risk capital businesses are hardly found in Latin America and
17
13 In effect they are being used to foster institutional infrastructure development and maintenance,
as in the case of Mexico, and to promote patenting related activities as it is happening in Brazil since
the year 2002, when tax deductions for enterprises that carry out R&D activities were doubled if
the business units are granted the patent for which they applied for.
14 Risk capital industries are based on private capitals but need public policies to create a favourable
environment, to foster liquidity in financial markets, to promote adequate regulatory and incentive
systems and to encourage public and private agents involvement in innovation and technological
upgrading.the Caribbean
15. Scant development of financial markets and institutions
and strong uncertainty and volatility of regional macro setting could partly
account for the low presence of risk capital operations in Latin America, due
to the close linkage existing between this form innovative and risky busi-
ness support and financial markets.
A rising topic related with S&T policy is intellectual property (IP) manage-
ment. There have been several changes in this domain in recent times. On
the one hand, there have been changes in international IP management,
such as the TRIPS agreement in 1994, and the wave of bilateral free trade
agreements (FTA) and bilateral investment treaties (BIT) containing IP pro-
visions
16. On the other hand, a changing attitude towards patenting and
privatization of knowledge emerged.  In the US, the Bayh-Dole act of 1980
introduced the possibility for universities to patent discoveries obtained
through federal funds
17. After the adoption of TRIPS most Latin American
and Caribbean countries introduced substantial changes in IP regimes. The
expansion of the IPRs resulted in the introduction of minimum standards, in
the increasing number of patentable products and processes and in the
license to import already patented products by means of including this
activity under the umbrella of ‘sufficient exploitation’. 
More recently, countries started to recognize the relevance of IP for their
catching up. They have pushed for a change in IP governance, both at the
bilateral and multilateral level, rather for a change in terms of organization-
al behavior of institutions dealing with IP management
18. Intellectual
Property systems are a complex governing arena whose operating mecha-
nisms are not easily manageable. Effective IP management requires proper
infrastructure and institutions and actors’ preparedness, as well as suitable
legal architecture and enforcing mechanisms. Countries need to define their
own policy towards patentable subject matter (this is especially relevant in
the case of biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals, as for publicly funded
research) and they need to develop an IP policy in line with their production
and innovation development policy. 
18
15 The Argentine Program to support technology base enterprises and risk capital, the Brazilian INO-
VAR Project and the Risk Capital Portal, the Colombian fund for risk capital investments, the risk
capital initiative of the multisectoral investment bank in Salvador and the Mexican capital risk fund
for technological development are some regional initiatives in terms of risk capital financing.
16 See Cimoli, Coriat and Primi (2009) for an analysis of recent changes in IP regimes.
17 Beyond the reflection that this provision would foster the dissemination of university research to
production, various analysts have raised concerns regarding the drawbacks of the so-called “privati-
zation of scientific activities”, which entails rising costs to access basic research results, augment-
ed patenting overheads and amplified risks and costs of legal controversies (Correa, 2003). In reali-
ty, the “public nature” of knowledge is definitively shifting towards the private and club goods
domain, where access is ruled by given market mechanisms, thus incrementing access barriers to
basic research’s results.
18 For a critical discussion on the development agenda presented to WIPO see De Beer (2009).In recent times, another common feature of S&T policies in the countries of
the region is the increasing concern in fostering interaction and coordination
between the public sector (mainly universities and research laboratories)
and the private sector (essentially enterprises) in research and development.
Most financing mechanisms emphasize articulation and co-participation of
supply and demand side in technological upgrading, establishing incentive
schemes to foster cooperation between them through various channels.
Private-public partnership might be a prerequisite for applying for financial
support, or additional mechanisms might favour the transfer of capacities
between the different agents. An example is the new Brazilian Innovation
Law in which greater degree of freedom is given to university researchers
for undertaking temporary research at private sector institutions. These ini-
tiatives, however, have still to gain strength and economic significance as
budgets remain low and practices are still not in accordance with the behav-
iour of production agents. In effect, partly of the scanty results of these
regional S&T supporting mechanisms, alongside reduced budgets, could be
due to the asymmetry between this attention to coordination and the char-
acteristics of regional production specialization. The Latin American and
Caribbean production pattern on the one hand, induces private sector and
enterprises to express a meagre demand for knowledge, and on the other
hand, leads domestic agents to mostly seek outward oriented linkages, priv-
ileging foreign companies and research laboratories that already have sound
reputation and worldwide recognized experience in effective and efficient
S&T efforts. Thus a mismatch ensues between demand side needs and
supply side offerings, hampering policies’ impact.
Policies to support the creation of research consortia, science parks and
public-private partnership for research have been designed, although sel-
dom implemented, in almost all the countries of the region.
19 Although this
recent shift in the policy model overcomes the drawback of linearity in pol-
icy conception, allowing interaction and cooperation between public and
private sector, this new model seems to be a kind of ‘soft’ policy approach.
The linkage with sectoral differences and industrial priorities is still missing,
and neutrality prevails over selection. Latin America needs to go beyond
good intentions in policy formulation and to avoid the typical mismatch
between supply and demand in public policy intervention.
The most notable example is the newly launched (May 2008) Brazilian pro-
duction development policy, which represents the most advanced effort in
Latin America in terms of policy design and articulation. The policy is under
the general coordination of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade
19
19 For a review of policy instruments to support S&T development by country for Latin America and
the Caribbean see the ECLAC-GTZ database, available at www.cepal.org/iyd.(MDIC). Above this Ministry, there is a consultative body responsible for
identifying the policy’s main priorities (the National Industrial Development
Council, CNDI). This well articulated, although complex, institutional design
also considers an executive secretariat composed by the representatives of
National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES), the Ministry of
Finance (MF) and the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (ABDI). The
creation of the executive board responds to the will of reducing institution-
al bottlenecks that hamper the operation of even well-designed industrial
policies, which usually tend to be managed by ministries which are less
powerful than institutions in charge of disbursing the financial resources.
Ministries in charge of specific issues are responsible for the identification
of their strategies and for coordination with the production development
policy (the ministry of Science, Technology and Industry, the Ministry of
Health, etc.), (Peres and Primi, 2009). This institutional design allows to link
science and technology policies to production development, thus allowing
for overcoming the chronicle mismatch between policies fostering innova-
tion and policies fostering production. 
Central and Eastern Europe
20
From the existing scientific and policy analytical literature we can distil two
fundamental problems that persist in the innovation systems of CEE countries
since a decade if not for a longer period.
21 First, in most CEE countries there
is a long-standing and strong mismatch between R&D and education system
outcomes and industry needs. This mismatch has in turn two mutually
enforcing aspects: one the one hand, innovation policies in CEE tend to focus
on high technology (for instance, commercialization of R&D results, technol-
ogy parks, incubators, etc); on the other hand, actual economic and indus-
trial structure is characterized by low productivity growth and dominated by
outsourcing activities with very low demand for R&D or indeed for most out-
comes targeted by innovation policies. Second, in most CEE countries inno-
vation policies suffer from double fragmentation: on the one hand, there is a
strong fragmentation and divide between various actors in the innovation
system (universities, companies, and governments); on the other hand, also
within the public sector fragmentation between various policy areas (educa-
tion, industry, energy etc) is strong. Such double fragmentation leads to mas-
sive and systematic coordination failures in policy design, implementation and
evaluation. Clearly, the two challenges are connected and enforcing each
20
20 This sub-section builds on Kattel, Reinert and Suurna, 2009, and Karo and Kattel, 2009.
21 See for detailed country overviews European Commission’s Innovation Trend-Chart, 2006 and
2007; see also Radosevic, 2004 and 2006; Reid and Peter, 2008; and Kattel, Reinert and Suurna,
2009. Best research on the CEE innovation systems from the late 1990s also covers the earlier tran-
sition period, see in particular Radosevic, 1998 and 1999.other. In this section, however, we intend to show how these challenges
originate from the application of Washington Consensus policy toolbox to
CEE economies and while the European Union recognized and emphasised
these problems throughout the accession talks and during the negotiations
for implementation of EU’s structural funding in 2000s, EU’s influence has,
perversely, enforced or even deepened these challenges. At the same time,
EU’s influence is a clear step towards much more coherent innovation poli-
cies in CEE. In addition, there are also success cases, for instance Slovenia
has followed from the outset a rather different approach to innovation policy
strongly focused on local capacity building, (Drahokoupil, 2007).
Restructuring Soviet R&D system and industry 
At the end of the 1980s, Eastern European and former Soviet economies
were generally highly industrialized and many of these economies were
seemingly on a similar industrialization and growth path as the East Asian
economies. According to the World Bank data, countries like Estonia, Latvia
and Hungary were ahead of Korea in the early 1980s in terms of industrial
value added per capita. (World Bank WDI online database) However, the
industrialization of CEE countries was widely understood to be highly artifi-
cial and ineffective, using in other words excessive amounts of resources
and other inputs to produce goods. Thus, after regaining the independence,
restructuring the economy and in particular the industry was on top of the
agenda for all CEE countries. In fact, in many ways what was desired was
not so much restructuring as outright replacement of old Soviet industry
with one similar to the Western industries.
Washington Consensus policies offered a very coherent and relatively sim-
ple set of policies to deliver the restructuring and replacement. While all CEE
countries set out to implement reforms inspired by the Washington
Consensus, Drahokoupil (2007, 90) offers a very interesting way how to
group different strategies followed by CEE countries in 1990s: “The com-
petition states in the Visegrád four can be called Porterian, aiming at attract-
ing strategic FDI through targeted subsidies … The Baltic competition states
can be called macroeconomic stability-driven neoliberal states with mone-
tary institutions at their core. … Finally, Slovenia has developed a distinct
type of competition state, which can be characterized as a balanced neo-
corporatist.” However, as Weissenbacher (2007, 71) argues, Hungary,
Poland and Yugoslavia had experiences of dealing with IMF already during
1980s when they borrowed from it and applied standard austerity pro-
grams. Thus, while there are clearly differences in accents, the general
framework offered by Washington Consensus  was applied in all CEE coun-
tries throughout the 1990s and indeed the policy sets were actually con-
verging during the 1990s, (Drahokoupil, 2007). 
21Furthermore, Washington Consensus inspired policies were considered by
most CEE countries as the innovation and industrial policy measures and in
essence there were no other policy initiatives during 1990s. During this
period, almost all of economic policy capacity building was directed
towards macro-economic competencies (at central banks, ministries of
finance, also think tanks). This was greatly helped by the advice and assis-
tance from the Washington institutions such the World Bank and IMF, but
also from OECD. Innovation policy was considered as secondary to transi-
tion related concerns. As there were no innovation policies proper, there
was also essentially no institution building for or in the innovation systems.
Washington Consensus inspired policies were understood to deliver the
economic stability to attract foreign direct investments that should become
vehicles of delivering actual restructuring and replacement of Soviet indus-
try. In other words, market demand was understood to deliver economic
restructuring and along with it create also a need and direction for innova-
tion system reform (R&D, education systems, labour policy etc). Building up
capacity in specific areas of innovation systems seemed superfluous;
indeed, R&D system was seen in many ways as too big (employing too
many people) and ineffective (too far from the private sector). (Radosevic,
1998 and 1999 offer good overviews) 
In reality, the Washington Consensus policies were even too effective in
destroying the old industrial structure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most
CEE and other former Soviet economies saw deep dives in their growth
rates and in industry as well as service sector value added. It took more
than a decade for most CEE countries to reach the growth and development
levels of 1990 (see further Tiits et al., 2008). This is particularly so in the
case of former Soviet republics. According the World Bank’s (2006) calcu-
lations, the recession many former Soviet republics (e.g., Ukraine) experi-
enced during 1990s, and are still experiencing, is worse than the Great
Depression in the USA and the World War II in Western Europe (in both
cases, recovery was considerably quicker).
This cognitive dissonance between promise of reforms and actual develop-
ments was caused by one of the most striking features of post-Soviet devel-
opment in the 1990s: the rapid primitivization of industrial enterprises or
even the outright destruction of many previously well-known and success-
ful companies. This happened because of the way Soviet industrial compa-
nies were built up and ran in a complex web of planning and competition.
(Radosevic, 1998) A sudden opening of the markets and abolition of capi-
tal controls made these industrial companies extremely vulnerable. The par-
tially extreme vertical integration that was the norm in such companies
meant that if one part of the value chain ran into problems due to the rapid
liberalization, it easily brought down the entire chain or complex. However,
foreign companies seeking to privatize plants were almost always interest-
22ed in only part of the value-chain (a specific production plant, infrastructure
or location) and thus privatization turned into publicly led attrition of com-
panies and jobs (see, e.g., Frost and Weinstein, 1998; Young, 1994).
Such a drastic change made it relatively easy to actually replace Soviet
industry: with the macroeconomic stability and liberalization of markets,
followed by a rapid drop in wages, many former Soviet economies became
increasingly attractive as privatization targets and destinations for out-
sourcing of production. Indeed, one of the most fundamental characteris-
tics of CEE industry (and services) since 1990 has been that the majority
of companies have engaged in process innovation (i.e., in the form of
acquisition of new machinery and mastery of production capabilities) in
seeking to become more and more cost-effective in the new market place.
(Tiits et al., 2008)
Perversely mirroring the above-described ‘cluster’-like characteristic of
Soviet industrial activities, the Soviet R&D system was based on similar ver-
tical integration of R&D into specialized institutions: “Under socialism, most
technical change was pushed from one institutional sector … which was
essentially a grouping of R&D institutes and other related activities … This
sector involved in activities far beyond R&D including design, engineering
and often trouble-shooting activities.” (Radosevic, 1999, 282) These insti-
tutions were usually also the originators and carriers of patents and forms
of intellectual property rights. (Ibid., 285) This means that the Soviet-style
R&D system had very low level of company in house R&D. (Radosevic,
1998, 80-81) Industrial conglomerates were effectively cut off from vari-
ous potential learning and feedback loops; production and actual innovation
(in particular in form of new products and processes) took place in different
institutions, both however highly concentrated and integrated. Thus, in gen-
eral the system was highly linear and supply based.
The once complex engineering, designing or similar tasks were in the tran-
sition processes very rapidly replaced by significantly more simpler com-
modified support activities as many companies were wiped out, privatized
or restructured. The former R&D institutes could have played key role in
bridging academic research with industry needs as they were essentially the
only existing link between the two. With the collapse of the institutes sys-
tem, the link between academy-industry became, as Radosevic suspected
in 1998, the weakest link in the CEE R&D system. (1998, 90) Indeed, in
“conditions of high uncertainty and prolonged privatization, the intangible
assets and know-how of industrial institutes, primarily embodied in R&D
groups, probably erodes much faster than production skills in industry.”
(1998, 100)
23Massive onslaught of FDI, in particular since the second half of 1990s and
privatization of enterprises gave foreign enterprises key role in industrial
restructuring and innovation. This, in turn, only reinforced severing of link-
ages between former R&D institutes and enterprise sector. (See also
Radosevic, 1999, 297)
Thus, we can sum up the key features of CEE innovation systems before
the accession into the EU as follows:
- Privatization programs and other measures to attract foreign direct 
investments;
- Emphasis on macro-economic stability;
- Erosion and partial disintegration of the previous Soviet R&D 
system;
- Market demand as key force of restructuring and reform of inno-
vation system.
Europeanization of innovation policy in CEE since 1998
While EU’s importance for CEE countries economic policies was visible
already during early 1990s, the change that increased EU’s impact consid-
erably was the beginning of accession talks with most CEE countries in
1998 and later. Indeed, Havlik et al. (2001) argue that the adoption of the
EU’s acquis communautaire has had a much stronger impact on the mod-
ernization of CEE industry than official (often rudimentary) innovation policy
during 1990s. The introduction of new regulation (usually with significantly
higher safety, health and other standards) meant that CEE industry “was
forced to choose whether to modernize their products and production facil-
ities rather drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with bigger players
with greater economies of scale, or to close down altogether”. (Tiits et al.,
2008, 76-77) In essence, on the one hand, the harmonization process was
a continuation of restructuring processes that started during the previous
period and were even significantly enforced. On the other hand, through so-
called pre-structural funding and its management, many CEE countries start-
ed to develop first strategic documents and policies related to innovation
and R&D proper. In this sense the EU integration played enormously posi-
tive roll on all CEE countries and their innovation policies.
However, similarly to Washington Consensus inspired reforms in 1990s,
harmonization process was seen largely as a further legitimization of CEE’s
path. Thus, the end itself – accession to the EU – became much more
important than what and how was being harmonized. Due to considerable
self-imposed time pressure – harmonizing the legal infrastructure and
24preparing for accession in 6 years – meant that adoption of EU’s legal infra-
structure was done hastily and without much attention to local context.
(PHARE Consolidated Summary Report, 2004 and 2007; see also
Schimmelfennig and  Sedelmeier, 2004; Goetz, 2001).
There were two main vehicles of harmonization: PHARE funding mechanism
and later pre-structural funding. PHARE was launched in 1989 as EU’s finan-
cial instrument to assist the CEE countries (initially only Hungary and Poland)
in their political and economic transition from a centralised communist sys-
tem to a decentralised liberal democratic system. In the late 1990s, due to
the progressive decentralization of the PHARE management structures as
well as EU requirement for creation of regional and local institutions to admin-
ister the EU funds after the accession, a system of implementation agen-
cies/administrative agents linked to the National Funds was created and pur-
sued in CEE (Commission Decision on the Review of the PHARE Guidelines
for the period 2000-2006; Grabbe, 2006, 82). This marks the first step in
CEE towards managing economic policy, and thus innovation and industrial
restructuring in a distinctly different manner from the previous period where
the free market and external forces were seen as key drivers of change.
However, it is also important to see that these newly established agencies
are mostly for managing external funding, policy creation and respective
capacity building plays almost no role in these agencies. The compartmen-
talized and structured nature of EU support (PHARE Consolidated Summary
Report, 2007) on the one hand, and from the 1990s inherited lack of tradi-
tion of partnership and inter-institutional coordination and cooperation
between administrative levels on the other hand, meant that most positive
effects of such agencies were not reaped and that they created in some
cases more difficulties and problems than they solved (ESPON, 2005).
In sum, in many ways the harmonization with the EU rules is a period where
policies supported the restructuring of the industry that began in 1990s
under the Washington Consensus  policies; on the other hand, during this
period EU’s influence on funding and administrative schemes brought cre-
ation of novel governance structures that play up to today key part in inno-
vation policy in CEE. 
While harmonization with the EU legal infrastructure was important both in
terms of actual changes it brought to industry and in terms of policy imple-
mentation/administrative agencies that were created to manage EU’s finan-
cial help, the key changes in innovation policy proper came with EU struc-
tural funding
22 that started in 2004 and is set to continue at least until
25
22 For a general overview, see the EU’s official homepage for structural funding, http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm.2013. Indeed, as we will see below, the EU structural funding significantly
changed both the policy content and implementation. However, as we will
also see below, key problems that emerged during 1990s (low networking,
weak coordination and significant cooperation problems) have been in fact
deepened during the current period.
The key content for many innovation policy initiatives in CEE emerging after
the accession was the underlying assumption that similarly to ‘old’
European countries, also the new members need to overcome the so-called
‘European paradox’ (good basic research, low commercialization of the
research results).
23 Thus, CEE innovation policies emerging in early and mid
2000s tend to concentrate on high technology sectors, on commercializing
university research, technology parks for start-ups and similar efforts.
(Radosevic, 2002, 355; Radosevic and Reid, 2006, 297; also INNO-Policy
TrendChart Country Reports, 2006 and 2007 for comprehensive overviews
of CEE countries’ policies and challenges) In contents, overwhelming num-
ber of policy measures concentrate upon innovation programmes and tech-
nology platforms. (Reid and Peter, 2008) At the same time, the CEE emerg-
ing innovation policies are characterized by their horizontal nature: policy
measures typically do not specify sectors but are rather open too all sec-
tors. Arguably, this has to do with they way CEE policy makers understood
EU state aid regulations (Reid and Peter, 2008). We argue that this has to
do with both general neo-liberal outlook inherited from the 1990s (i.e., mar-
ket demand is seen as key driver for R&D system) internalized by most CEE
policy makers by early 2000s and also their particular skills that concen-
trated into macro-economic area. (See also Drahokoupil, 2007) 
In addition, as majority of CEE measures are financed through EU structur-
al funds, these instruments are mostly competition and project based.
These aspects – project based implementation, multitude of horizontal
measures – point to high fragmentation of the entire innovation policy field
as well as to lack of policy priorities or the ability to set the latter. It is also
evidence of the strongly market-driven understanding of innovation that is
at odds with underlying assumption that innovation policies need to allevi-
ate the ‘European paradox’. That is, typical CEE innovation policy measure
aims to commercialize a certain R&D result, typically in an high-tech area,
but the result and thus the initiative has to come from the market. This,
however, has scarcely any justifications in reality: first, CEE R&D systems
and their performance disintegrated heavily during 1990s; second, this was
complemented by the strong specialization into low-end of various value-
chains meaning that the demand for R&D and skills remain relatively low.
26
23 An excellent discussion of the paradox is Dosi, Llerena and Labini 2005.In terms of implementation, the trend initiated during the harmonization
period through creation of financial and management agencies has been
intensified with the structural funds. (See INNO-Policy TrendChart Country
Reports, 2006 and 2007 for an overview) It is fair to say that the problems
with these agencies that started during the harmonization period are par-
tially deepened since 2004. Indeed, it can be argued that most problems
summarized above in CEE innovation policies, go in one way or other back
to the institutional framework of agencies. Almost all CEE innovation poli-
cy implementation problems go back to very weak and disorganised actors,
coordination problems are rampant in policy design and implementation (see
also Radosevic, 2002, 355). On the one hand, there is a clear separation
of policy responsibility between education/science and innovation/industry
on the ministerial level and its delivery system (Nauwelaers and Reid, 2002,
365; also see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports, 2006 and 2007).
On the other hand, this kind of fragmented policy-making system has in its
turn resulted in the lack of inter-linking and cooperation between different
innovation-related activities and actors such as research organisations, gov-
ernment and industry (see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports, 2006
and 2007). 
Thus, to sum up, while with the introduction of structural funds and
through strong influence from the European Commission, CEE innovation
policies are significantly changing since mid-2000s, there are also serious
problems that emerged with this trend. First, as we argued, the emerging
innovation policies tend to be based on rather linear understanding of inno-
vation (from lab to market) whereas most CEE countries are specialized into
low end production activities virtually void of any research and with low
demand for high skills; in addition, R&D system as such has been under
constant pressure since the transition and its performance has been clearly
lacking. Thus, CEE innovation policies tend solve problems not existing in
the respective economies and in this context the problem of misunder-
standing of the Soviet R&D and industry in 1990s is replicated to the poli-
cy-making model of the 2000s. 
Second, through creation of innovation policy implementation/administra-
tive agencies (for structural funding and beyond), the innovation policy land-
scape is fragmented and previous problems in policy creation (lack of strate-
gic skills and capacity, networking and coordination non-existent) and
implementation (competitive grant-based programming that relies on market
signals without being able to follow set priorities and goals) are only deep-
ened. One can argue that the innovation policies emerging in the process of
Europeanization are based on the assumption that policy design and imple-
mentation follow public-private partnership model, yet in reality CEE coun-
tries singularly lack the ability to implement such a model and what is more,
27actual developments in industry seem to suggest that such a model is par-
ticularly ill-fitted to CEE context. 
In addition, there is an essential problem that CEE economic and innovation
policy making ignored throughout 1990s and 2000s in devising policies to
deliver economic restructuring and growth. Stable macro-economic envi-
ronment envisioned to enable FDI inflow – in which CEE were indeed spec-
tacularly successful – also encouraged massive private foreign lending
(mostly through foreign banks settling into CEE markets that borrowed in
foreign currency). This drove in particular since the mid 2000s consump-
tion and real-estate booms in all CEE countries. (See, e.g., Fitch, 2007a,
2007b and 2007c; see also Krugman, 2008b in this context) Indeed, most
CEE countries are highly dependent on foreign investments and private bor-
rowing and thus they were caught in a macroeconomic dead end with
appreciating exchange rates, negative current account balances and grow-
ing private indebtedness. This led to increased financial fragility through
deteriorating balance of payments account and left CEE countries starving
for new foreign lending and investments that however stopped in the after-
math of the global financial meltdown in 2008. In essence, CEE industrial
restructuring and innovation model became a giant Ponzi scheme. As glob-
al, and especially inner-EU demand slows, so do CEE exports and by early
2009 most CEE currencies have seen massive drops in their value and for-
eign investors seem to flee en masse. Debt deflation looks very likely sce-
nario for the coming years. Fragmented innovation policy scene, inherited
from the accession into the EU, paralyses CEE countries into inaction as
there seems to be no serious policy evaluation capacity present and coor-
dination problems prevent quick reaction to radically changed environment.
Thus, we can sum up the influence of the EU upon CEE innovation systems
as follows:
- Much more active role of the state in structural and innovation 
policies;
- Policies concentrate on commercialization and other R&D aspects; 
high technology bias certified;
- Increasing fragmentation of policy arena through agencies that
results in strong coordination problems;
- Growing mismatch between R&D system, high-tech biased inno-
vation policy and actual industry needs.
28Policy models in a comparative perspective
It is possible to identify three main phases in the evolution of innovation pol-
icy in LA and CEE (see Table 2). During the import substitution in LA and
the Soviet administration in CEE linear supply policy regime prevailed. The
state was actively involved in the generation of the basic scientific and
technological infrastructure (national research institutes and public research
laboratories in strategic areas), as a support to the generation of production
capacities in sectors such as mechanical, nuclear, transport and telecom-
munication. The linear supply model implicitly assumed that scientific
progress would automatically turn into technological innovation. Policy
measures were selective in terms of targeted sectors and the provision of
knowledge was centralized and basically in the hand of public laboratories.
S&T policies were a component of the industrialization strategy and ulti-
mately supported the creation of basic capabilities for supporting produc-
tion in key strategic sectors. The model was not perfect in itself, as all mod-
els are not; but it served the purpose of creating the institutional infra-
structure and the basic capabilities for the transition towards industrializa-
tion. Some drawbacks of the model were the lack of coordination between
different activities and the lack of mechanisms for avoiding the capture of
rents by incumbents.
In the decade of the 1990s both regions followed the Washington
Consensus and embraced a series of market-led reforms. However, while it
was sure that reforms were needed in the management of policies to sup-
port production development and the accumulation of technological capa-
bilities, the obsession with macroeconomic stability led to marginalization
of policies directed to microeconomic behaviour. Reforms to the previous
linear supply model were needed, however the change in policy model
induced by the Washington Consensus failed to target and correct the
shortcomings of the previous model; instead they introduced a radical shift
in policy model. State intervention was minimized, and a linear demand ori-
ented policy regime was introduced. The market logic ruled the innovation
policy discourse, and the private sector was seen as the primary repository
of knowledge and innovation capabilities. Getting the framework conditions
right, simplifying mechanisms for technology transfer (especially North-
South in the case of LA) and establishing funds and credits for innovating
firms were the mostly accepted policy tools. The reforms favoured mod-
ernization of production apparatus through rising capital imports and FDI;
however, in the case of LA the modernization strengthened already estab-
lished actors and did not trickled down to the rest of the production appa-
ratus; in the case of CEE, the reforms led to fast and furious replacement
of Soviet industry with low value-added outsourcing production. In addition,
the reforms delinked the efforts for strengthening S&T capabilities from the
industrialization effort. Implicitly, S&T started to be considered as ‘neutral’
29and the policy regime turned into a demand oriented one, with stimulus
packages for innovation and technological upgrading offered through open
calls to firms. 
One of the drawbacks of that policy model was the persistent linearity in
addressing innovation; in addition, the countries of the regions would have
required policies supporting industrialization and the creation of production
capacities together with the support for innovation, instead of importing
good practices from the ‘north’ which however had little impact in a con-
text in which the demand for innovation from domestic agents was scant
due to structural conditions. 
Slowly, while the market-led approach showed its limits in the capacity to
support catching up and technical change, and in line with changes in pol-
icy attitude in frontier countries, both LA and CEE entered in a post
Washington Consensus phase, which for CEE has been marked by the
process of accession to the EU. In those years a new language became to
be adopted by the innovation policy community and a systemic approached
prevailed. Public-private partnerships and cooperation between the agents
of the national innovation system were advocated as the main drivers for
innovation. Multidisciplinariety was included as a key driver for fostering the
generation and application of new ideas and efforts to design policies
through a participatory approach were developed. Clearly, the transition to
a non linear policy model which recognizes the systemic dimension of inno-
vation represents a positive step, however, the reform failed to address the
main problem posed by the previous generation of reforms: the detachment
between innovation and industrial structure. In essence, both LA and CEE
countries have experienced in past two decades a ‘stop-and-go’ evolution
in innovation policy: each new policy model has tried to target problems
inherited from previous policy generation but has mostly failed to do so and
in fact created additional problems in policy implementation and coordina-
tion. This leads to what we call periphery paradox in innovation policy:
despite growing importance given to innovation policy in LA and CEE
economies, actual policy capacity and policy effectiveness does not rise
accordingly. One of the explanations we adduce, in the evolution of the
political economy of innovation policy in the ‘periphery’, is the missing link
between the production side and the innovation policy.
The financial crisis urged countries to redefine priorities and investment
strategies; it also let countries to face key production challenges such as
social and environmental sustainability of current consumption and produc-
tion patterns. Advanced countries deepened the debate on which types of
innovation they should foster and through which mechanisms. A shift
towards a greener, fairer and more oriented to knowledge circulation and
diffusion policy agenda seems to be forthcoming. Peripheral regions will
30probably face the same transition; however, they should avoid pursuing this
spiral of moving the innovation policy target without solving the problems
by previous policy efforts. Policy learning proceeds through trials and errors,
but errors need to be identified and corrected in order to engender a virtu-
ous policy process. Overcoming the current mismatch between innovation
policy and production development is a must for peripheral regions. There
are no blue prints for linking back innovation policies with an industrializa-
tion strategy aiming at creating domestic capabilities in key sector; each
country should identify how to do it and through which institutions and
mechanisms. A regional dialogue could support this process and ease the
transfer of good practices and experiences between countries. 



















































































Source: own elaboration based on Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi, 2005 and Kattel, Reinert and Suurna,
2009.While in frontier countries there are already industrial constituencies lobbing
for innovation policy, developing countries still face the challenge of build-
ing production capacities which will represent the targeted audience of the
innovation policy, and in addition they need to respond to the global
demand (pressure) coming from foreign companies operating in peripheral
countries. Innovation policy is not a neutral policy, it is a policy with strong
sectoral components, and in developing economies this means that it needs
to be coupled with policies supporting production development. It is in this
mismatch between the production structure specialization and the innova-
tion policy discourse that we identify a similarity between LA and CEE,
beyond the innovation ‘failure’ versus ‘success’ vision. Both regions need
to increase productivity, employment and well-being and a modification in
the prevailing specialization pattern towards more knowledge intensive
activities coupled with modernization of average production techniques and
organization is needed.
A generalized call for innovation, detached from policies supporting struc-
tural change and the creation of domestic production and scientific capa-
bilities, will not suffice. Currently, LA and CEE both suffer from the ‘periph-
ery paradox’ in innovation policy; i.e. rising political attention towards inno-
vation detached from efforts devoted to strengthen the actors (firms, uni-
versities, institutions) which demand and offer the knowledge required for
innovation. The detachment of the innovation policy from the dynamics of
the real economy is particularly dangerous in peripheral countries which
need to create a consensus for supporting innovation policies. Supporting
innovation without creating and strengthening the actors which should
innovate is a costly mistake, not only in budgetary terms, but because this
attitude contributes to delegitimize policies augmenting the impression that
‘policies do not work’. And, in fact they do not work, or they have a
reduced impact because most of the time, for well designed they are, they
address a missing actor. This happened, especially in the case of technolo-
gy transfer policies and the policies supporting patenting activities. In con-
texts where firms carry out basically incremental innovations and modern-
ization of production, a policy fostering patenting basically misses its tar-
get: a firm for which patenting could be a good corporate strategy. Hence,
those policies should be a support and should be ancillaries to policies fos-
tering the creation of innovative production agents. 
The 'pro-innovation' momentum: a way out from the 
periphery paradox?
After the 1990s, the decade in which ‘no policy’ was the best policy, inno-
vation policies are back on the development agenda in Latin America as well
as in Central and Easter Europe. The political conjuncture of the last years
32has been particularly favorable to innovation, at least at the rhetorical level.
However, countries face serious barriers in implementing policies and in
matching innovation with structural change and industrialization. 
The financial crisis led frontier countries to prioritize innovation as a way out
from the crisis. In peripheral economies – which were in the process of cre-
ating endogenous technological and production capabilities – short term
competitive pressures would lead firms to reduce investments in R&D and
in risky and uncertain innovations. This reduces the technological base with
which those economies will face the post-crisis scenario. A sort of lock-in
process emerges, in which countries which should invest the most in sup-
porting the creation of endogenous technological capabilities are led to
invest less as a result of short term pressures. Redefining S&T priorities as
a response to the crisis in an optic of short term would reinforce peripheral
marginal position in the global economy. A proactive response is needed.
However, responding to the crisis it is easier said than done. Re-adaptation
and change are costly, and require time and resources. The speed, and the
direction of change, with which the firm responds to the shock it is crucial
to remain competitive in the market. And, obviously, not all firms will be
able to respond swiftly enough. The effects of the re-adaptation of capa-
bilities and production and investment strategies on productivity will not be
immediate. There will be a time-lag, and during this time, the economy will
necessarily experience a slowdown in productivity growth. Clearly, the time
for re-adaptation depends on many factors, such as the specificities of the
assets of firms, the kind of routines in the firm’s management strategy and
the general characteristics of the human capital – i.e. there is some degree
of stickiness in technological and production capacities of firms which
determines the time and direction of the re-adaptation process. A smart pol-
icy mix can support a smooth transition. 
Research and knowledge capabilities are difficult to reconvert and recover,
and the perception that knowledge will be the assets that will determine the
repositioning of powers in the post crisis, justify maintaining investments in
those assets even in a crisis scenario. Of course it is not a matter of ‘spend-
ing for the sake of spending’ as might be possible in a ‘bonanza’ momen-
tum. It is time for a ‘smart spending’. But ‘smart’ in this context is, more
than ever, a synonymous for technology, knowledge and intangibles asset,
not for cost-effectiveness and efficiency in investment.
However, looking at the crisis as a ‘creative destruction’ momentum in the
current capitalistic development, should not lead to naive stand viewing the
crisis as straightforward opportunity. Opportunities will be strictly linked with
capabilities in new paradigms and technologies. Countries which master rel-
evant knowledge in the new paradigms, countries that will have the human
capital in those areas, countries with big high tech firms, will have an easi-
33er way out of the crisis, than countries which were at the margins of the
knowledge game in the pre-crisis scenario. Likewise, there will be windows
of opportunities for all, but they will be understood and possibly profited only
by firms (and countries) which follow a knowledge-centred development
strategy and which will prioritize the construction of scientific and techno-
logical capabilities also in this crisis context. It is highly probable that in the
future the basis for competitiveness of firms will be largely redefined. New
demands will ensue, and probably there will be a redefinition of production
with a shift of priorities towards environmental sustainability and welfare
concerns, rather than on the tecological race of past years. 
The current financial crisis and the non-deferrable challenges of climate
change, energy and sustainability of production revitalized the debate of the
role of the state in the economy in advanced economies. There is a rising
interest in new forms of innovation which should better respond to citizen’s
needs and increasingly respect the environment and an efficient use of ener-
gies and resources. A window of opportunity opens for LA and CEE to sup-
port innovation and elaborate policy models which overcome the bottle-
necks of current situation. However, profiting from the reorganization of
powers and equilibria which will result after the crisis will not happen
through market forces alone. The (sometimes) oversimplified innovation dis-
course of last years has led to the elaboration of national plans which are
seldom or partially implemented, but which have at least generated certain
institutional learning in terms of policy management. Efforts should be tai-
lored to implementation and effective support to production development. 
The current ‘pro-innovation’ momentum – at the regional and the global level
– represents an opportunity to capitalize on past experiences and to overcome
some of the limits of the previous science and technology policy models.
A lesson that can be learned is that policies modify agents’ behavior
through incentives which then needs to be incorporated into policy design
in order to adapt policies to the new scenario. Also, policies require institu-
tion for their management and implementation and introducing new policies
requires analyzing which kind of institutional set up will support the policy
implementation and identify the adjustment mechanism needed to support
the translation of policy design to implementation. 
Learning, path dependency and cumulativeness affect the dynamics of poli-
cies and they should be taken into account when introducing reforms.
Actually, both in LA and in CEE there are success stories of policy evolu-
tion which avoided to be trapped in the ‘stop-and-go’ cycle of continuous
reforms addressing only partially the shortcomings of a model, and engen-
dering new problems which then needed to be solved by a new reform.
34Brazil, for example, is a success case in this respect. The various political
administrations supported the generation of scientific and technological capa-
bilities with certain continuity, allowing the country to capitalize on previous
experiences in policy design and management. The dynamic of innovation pol-
icy followed a more cumulative approach rather than a ‘stop-and-go’ and, in
the last years there have been several efforts to design comprehensive poli-
cies which link innovation capacities to production development. The PICTE
(Industrial, Technology and Trade Policy) launched in 2004 represented the
first return of industrial policies in the agenda and it institutionalized the need
to look at technology policies in the frame of a more complex policy mix; the
Production Development Policy launched in 2008 capitalizes on the previous
experience, and goes further in elaborating a policy mix which articulates sup-
port to industries with the need to create capacities in key strategic sectors.
Innovation is not ‘neutral’ in the current Brazilian policy; innovation is search
for and supported in given sectors and according to strategic priorities. This of
course, requires negotiations between actors and strong capabilities in policy
management in order to move from policy design to implementation. 
In CEE, the European Union has had enormous influence in redirecting CEE
countries’ attention to industrial upgrading and some countries have been
exemplary in building policies that correspond to industry needs, for
instance Slovenia. While Slovenia has been able to focus innovation poli-
cies towards upgrading existing industry and skills from the early on in
1990s, it serves as an exception not as a rule of CEE developments.
Indeed, it can be argued that there are strong historical reasons for
Slovenia’s success (e.g. partial private property prior to independence) that
are not replicable in the other CEE countries. 
Policy capacities are built over time through a cumulative process, just as
scientific, technological and innovation capacities. There are multiple policy
approaches and models, some better fit in certain contexts, others they are
more appropriate for more advanced countries, however it is not the ‘best
policy model’ that should be searched for, but a possible policy regime
which taking into account the starting point of policy management capaci-
ties and production structure will better respond to the need of fostering
innovation and structural change. Policy fine tuning is probably more desir-
able than a radical shift in prevailing policy approach which will undermine
the process of policy learning and accumulation of capacities. 
Conclusions
There are no generic blue prints for an optimal technology policy. Policy
goals, instruments and capabilities must be tailored to country specific con-
text and time requirements and they have to cope with local financial con-
35straints. The mix of suitable policies should take into account regional speci-
ficities and should be designed on the basis of a renewed and more prag-
matic technology policy model which needs new institutional settings for
policy management and implementation.
Disposing of a well designed policy is not a sufficient guarantee. A key fac-
tor of success for any technology policy is the matching of its goals with
production structure needs and effective demand. Path dependent and
cumulative processes form key features of policy processes that should be
taken into account while devising new or revising existing initiatives. The
design and implementation of innovation policies requires mechanisms for
policy follow up. Establishing mechanisms for identifying success and fail-
ure factors in policy implementation and the creation of institutional mech-
anisms for fine tuning policy accordingly are required. 
The process of construction of capabilities for innovation is costly, in terms
of the necessary time, resources and institutional experiments. While it is
normal to progress along this track by trial and error, it has to be recognized
that errors are not always easily reversible. Identifying factors which engen-
der failures in the process of policy design and implementation matters for
improving the capacity to develop new policy solutions which actually bet-
ter respond to the challenges posed by the changing context and nature of
innovation, but which limit the generation of ‘new problems’ which will need
new policies to deal with. Usually a policy, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ will
engender changes in the scenario and in the agents’ responses, and proba-
bility new or modified policies will be needed to deal with the reshaped sce-
nario. However, while advanced countries usually concentrate their policy
efforts in identifying new trends for implementing policies which are able to
deal with those trends and which ultimate goal is to support the country’s
competitiveness and well-being, in the periphery it happens that the policy
dynamic tends to be trapped by a sort of Red-Queen effect (“Now, here,
you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place”
24),
where new policies are introduced, basically following foreign good prac-
tices, seldom implemented and with scant impacts due to the mismatch
with the demand side, thus engendering a ‘periphery paradox’.As it was
argued, and then dismissed, that Europe was suffering from a paradox, i.e.
a region characterized by excellence in research and poor capacity to trans-
late into production those research outcomes, the periphery seems to suf-
fer form a paradox in which innovation is in countries’ development agen-
das, but the moving target addressed by policies in the last decades has
been dominated by a ‘new problem – new policy solution’ approach rather
than on incremental efforts for building endogenous capabilities.
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